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Unlike perfectly competitive markets, health insurance and health care markets are characterized by asymmetric information in many forms. To see the consequences, consider the following scenario: The population is evenly divided between 2 types of people: healthy people and unhealthy people. Healthy people have expected health care costs of $1000 per year. Unhealthy people have expected health care costs of $5000 per year. Unhealthy people can become healthy by working out, eating healthier, and taking preventive care. Assume that the cost of becoming healthy in terms of time and effort is $2000 per year. These people live in a city with one employer who will hire anyone who is willing to work. This employer provides complete health care to all its employees; all health care costs are covered by the insurance.
1. Do the unhealthy employees have an incentive to become healthy?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. Not enough information.
2. What would the new actuarially fair cost of insurance be at the original firm?
3. What is the actuarial fair cost of insurance for all the workers?

Sagot :

1.  No, unhealthy employees do not have an incentive to become healthy.

2. The new actuarially fair cost of insurance would be $5000 at the original firm.

3. The actuarial fair cost of insurance for all the workers would be $3000

1.

No,  unhealthy employees do not have an incentive to become healthy. This is due to the fact that the only employer in the city is giving jobs to everyone regardless of their health status. Besides, their health care cost is covered and managed by the employer by the insurance. Therefore, unhealthy employees do not have an incentive to become healthy.

2.

The new actuarially fair cost of insurance can be determined by taking the probability of healthy employees and unhealthy employees with their health costs.

However, provided that all healthy people worked for the new employee, it implies that the original firm comprise of only the unhealthy workers and the new actuarially fair cost of insurance can be computed as follows:

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = Probability ( Healthy employee × cost of health) +  Probability (unhealthy employee × cost of health)

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = (0 × $1000) + (1 × $5000)

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = $5000

Therefore, the new actuarially fair cost of insurance would be $5000 at the original firm.

3.

The actuarial fair cost of insurance for all the workers refers to the total sum of required payoffs for both the healthy employees and unhealthy employees

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = Probability ( Healthy employee × cost of health) +  Probability (unhealthy employee × cost of health)

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = [tex]\mathbf{(\dfrac{1}{2} \times \$1000) + (\dfrac{1}{2} \times \$5000)}[/tex]

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = $500 + $2500

Actuarial Fair cost of insurance = $3000

Therefore, the actuarial fair cost of insurance for all the workers would be $3000

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